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Optimal Bidding Strategy of a Strategic Wind Power
Producer in the Short-Term Market
Ting Dai, Student Member, IEEE, and Wei Qiao, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Wind energy is a clean and renewable energy source
which is rapidly growing globally. As the penetration level of
wind power grows, the system operators need to consider wind
power producers as strategic producers whose bidding behav-
iors will have an impact on the locational marginal prices. This
paper proposes a bilevel stochastic optimization model to obtain
the optimal bidding strategy for a strategic wind power producer
in the short-term electricity market. The upper level problem of
the model maximizes the profit of the wind power producer, while
the lower level problem represents the market clearing processes
of both day-ahead and real-time markets. The uncertainties in the
demand, the wind power production, and the bidding strategies
of the strategic conventional power producers are represented by
scenarios in the model. The conditional value at risk of the selected
worst scenarios is included in the objective function for manag-
ing the risk due to uncertainties. Using the duality theory and
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker condition, the bilevel model is transferred
into a mixed-integer linear problem. Case studies are performed
to show the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Index Terms—Bidding strategy, electricity market, mathemat-
ical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), stochastic
optimization, wind power producer.
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and Sets:
t Index for time periods, running from 1 to T .
i Index for the conventional power producers,
running from 1 to I .
j Index for the wind power generating units
owned by the strategic producer, running
from 1 to J .
d Index for demands, running from 1 to D.
ω, ω′ Index of scenarios, running from 1 to Ω.
b Index of energy blocks offered by a power
producer, running from 1 to B.
l Index of demand blocks, running from 1 to L.
m, n Indices of system buses, running from 1 to
M/N .
ΨIm Set of indices of the conventional power pro-
ducers located at bus m.
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ΨDm Set of indices of the demands located at
bus m.
ΨWm Set of indices of the wind power units located
at bus m.
φm Set of indices of the buses connected to
bus m.
Decision Variables:
λWDbjt Offer price of block b of the wind gener-
ating unit j in a period t in the day-ahead
market.
λWRjt Offer price of the wind generating unit j in a
period t in the real-time market.
pWDbjt Produced power of block b of the wind gen-
erating unit j in a period t in the day-ahead
market.
PWRjtω Rescheduled power of the wind generat-
ing unit j in a period t in the real-time
market.
pCDbit Power of block b produced by the conven-
tional power producer i in a period t in the
day-ahead market.
PCR+it /P
CR−
it Increased/decreased power of the conven-
tional power producer i in a period t in the
real-time market.
pLDldt Power bought of block l of the demand d in a
period t in the day-ahead market.
PLRdt Accepted deviation of the demand d in a
period t in the real-time market.
λDAmt /λ
RT
mt Day-ahead/real-time locational marginal
price (LMP) at bus m in a period t.
RUit/R
D
it Up/down reserve scheduled for the conven-
tional power producer i in a period t.
RUt /R
D
t Total up/down reserve scheduled in a
period t.
rUit/r
D
it Up/down reserve deployed for the conven-
tional power producer i in a period t.
δDmt/δ
R
mt Voltage angle of bus m in a period t in the
day-ahead/real-time market.
ζ Auxiliary variable used to compute CVaR.
ηω Auxiliary variable used to compute CVaR in
a scenario.
Random Variables:
λCDbit Offer price of block b of the conventional
power producer i in a period t in the day-
ahead market
1949-3029 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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PWfjt Forecasted production of the wind generating
unit j in a period t.
PLRfdt Forecasted deviation of demand d in a period
t in the real-time market.
Other Variables:
CVaRα Conditional value at risk at α confidential
interval.
pCDmaxbit Capacity of block b of the conventional
power producer i in a period t in the day-
ahead market.
λLDldt Bidding price of block l of the demand d in a
period t in the day-ahead market.
pLDmaxldt Capacity of block l of the demand d in a
period t in the day-ahead market.
λRUit /λ
RD
it Offer price of the up/down reserve of
the conventional power producer i in a
period t.
λCR+it /λ
CR−
it Offer price of the increased/decreased power
of the conventional power producer i in a
period t in the real-time market.
λLRdt Bidding price of the deviated demand d in a
period t in the real-time market.
σDt Standard deviation of the total forecasted
demand in a period t.
σWjt Standard deviation of the forecasted power of
the wind generating unit j in a period t.
The variables, if augmented with a sub-
script ω, represent their realization in a
scenario ω.
Constants and Parameters:
Pmaxi Maximum output of the conventional power
producer i.
PWmaxj Installed capacity of wind power generating
unit j.
πω Probability of occurrence of a scenario ω.
Bmn Imaginary part of the admittance of line
m− n.
Cmaxmn Transmission capacity of line m− n.
δmaxm Upper limit of voltage magnitude of bus m.
δminm Lower limit of voltage magnitude of bus m.
Pmax+i /P
max−
i Maximum increased/decreased power that
can be provided by the conventional power
producer i.
RUmaxi /R
Dmax
i Maximum up/down reserve that can be pro-
vided by the conventional power producer i.
κ Factor relating the system reserve require-
ment to the standard deviations of load and
wind power.
λCapD Cap bidding price in the day-ahead market.
λCapR Cap bidding price in the real-time market.
α Per-unit confidence level.
β Risk-aversion parameter.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE installed capacity of wind power is increasing rapidlyall around the world. The global installed wind capacity
reached 282 GW at the end of 2012 [1]. The United States,
Germany, Spain, and China are the leading countries in terms
of installed wind capacity. According to a recent report [1], the
total installed wind capacity in the United States reached over
59 GW with nearly 13 GW of newly installed wind capacity in
2012. Due to the uncertainty and intermittency of wind power,
the increasing penetration of wind power into the electric power
system will pose challenges to power system operators.
In the United States, around 69% of the installed wind power
was sold through power purchasing agreements (PPAs) at a
fixed price in 2012 [2]. However, since the PPA price con-
tinuously declines after reaching the peak in 2008 and the
availability of PPA contracts has been limited since 2010,
wind power producers can no longer obtain stable revenues
through PPAs. As a consequence, wind power producers are
becoming more interested in selling power into the electric-
ity market. Currently, some of the U.S. market operators, e.g.,
the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM), and New York ISO,
allow wind power producers to submit their day-ahead com-
mitments into the markets. Same as the conventional power
producers, the wind power producers are subjected to mone-
tary penalties if their real-time productions deviate from their
commitments.
Due to the unpredictable characteristics of wind, wind power
producers are exposed to high risks in a competitive electric-
ity market. Some work has presented using stochastic models
to generate optimal bidding strategies for wind power produc-
ers to hedge against production uncertainty in the day-ahead or
adjustment market [3]–[5]. The stochastic models were proven
outperforming the deterministic ones generated by using fore-
casted values directly [6]. Another risk mitigation approach is
based on a combined and coordinated use of wind power and
energy storage or thermal units [7]–[10].
Most existing models in the literature generating bidding
strategies for wind power producers in the short-term market
are based on an assumption that wind power producers are
price-takers whose bidding strategies would not influence the
market price. In this case, the wind power producers would
only need to forecast the market price and use it as a stochastic
variable to determine their bidding strategies. However, as the
so-called Lerner index [11] has stated that the extent to which
the bidding prices exceed the marginal cost is a measurement
of market power, a wind power producer whose marginal cost
is lower than that of thermal power producers has nonegligible
market power and should be considered as a price-maker.
The strategic bidding model for a price-maker producer
in an electricity market can be formulated as a bilevel opti-
mization problem. The profit is maximized (or the cost is
minimized) for the producer at the upper level problem
with the information (e.g., cleared power production, sched-
uled amount of reserve, and LMPs) obtained from the lower
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level problem, which represents the market clearing pro-
cess conducted by the market operator. The low-level prob-
lems can be replaced by its first-order optimality conditions,
such as the widely used Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) con-
dition [12]. Thus, the original bilevel optimization problem
is transformed to a single-level problem, which is a mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [13].
The MPEC approach has been widely used to obtain the
optimal bidding strategies for conventional power producers
[14]–[16].
Stochastic programming [17] provided a suitable tool to
model the uncertainties faced by wind power producers in
the short-term market. For example, the uncertainties in wind
power production and real-time demand can be modeled as
random variables. In [18] and [19], the stochastic program-
ming approach has been combined with the MPEC approach
to solve the long-term wind power investment problem. The
medium-term decision-making problem of a retailer in the
future market and the pool could also be modeled using the
stochastic MPEC approach [20]. Reference [21] analyzed the
equilibrium of an oligopolistic market where each strategic pro-
ducer may own wind facilities. However, little work has been
reported on generating optimal bidding strategy for a wind
power producer using a stochastic MPEC approach. The most
recent work [22] and [23] proposed models to generate the
strategic bidding strategy for a wind power producer. In [22],
the wind power producer only behaved strategically in the real-
time market, while [23] only considered the wind power pro-
ducer to behave strategically in the day-ahead market. Neither
[22] nor [23] considered risk management that is important
for optimization involving uncertainties. Furthermore, neither
[22] nor [23] considered the uncertainty of the bidding strate-
gies of other strategic conventional power producers in the
market.
This paper proposes a stochastic MPEC model for generating
the optimal bidding strategies for price-maker wind power pro-
ducers. Compared with [22] and [23], the main contributions of
this paper are as follows.
1) The wind power producer is considered to be a strategic
player in both day-ahead and real-time markets. A com-
parison with the cases in which the wind power producer
only behaves strategically in either the day-ahead or the
real-time market is studied.
2) The uncertainties of the bidding strategies of other strate-
gic power producers are considered in the model.
3) Risk management is considered in the model.
4) The proposed model can be stepwise bidding curves for
the wind power producer.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
market framework and modeling of uncertainties. Section III
provides the detailed mathematical formulation of the bilevel
stochastic optimization model. Section IV transfers the
bilevel model to a single-stage stochastic MPEC model
and further to a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
model. Section V provides case studies of using the pro-
posed model to generate the optimal bidding strategy for
a strategic wind power producer. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Market Framework
In a pool-based electricity market, suppliers including wind
power producers are allowed to submit energy offer curves into
the day-ahead energy and reserve markets for each hour of the
next operating day. Once the day-ahead market is closed, the
ISOs or RTOs in most U.S. market aggregate the offer curves
and determine the hourly LMPs, the reserve market clearing
price, and the cleared energy volume of each producer. For each
hour, producers are paid for the cleared energy volume at the
day-ahead LMP. Afterward, the real-time market is performed
just minutes before the actual power delivery of each producer,
where supply resources are selected to increase or decrease
their generation to maintain the real-time balance of the system.
After the real-time market is cleared, the real-time LMPs, the
deployment of reserve, and the increased or decreased energy
volume of each generator will be decided. In most U.S. market,
the deviations of the actual generation and load from what were
scheduled in the day-ahead market are settled at the real-time
energy price in the real-time market. Those market participants
providing extra supply (or having less than the scheduled load)
will be paid at the real-time energy price, while those providing
less than the scheduled supply (or having extra demand) will
pay at the real-time energy price.
B. Uncertainty Modeling in Market Clearing Process
The uncertainties of the model in this paper come from
three main sources: 1) system load; 2) wind power produc-
tion; and 3) bidding strategies of strategic power producers.
Appropriately modeling these uncertainties is crucial for a wind
power producer to obtain the optimal bidding strategy.
The main uncertainty in the day-ahead market clearing pro-
cess comes from the load and wind forecast errors and the
bidding strategies of other strategic power producers. The load
and wind forecast errors are unintentional and depend on the
forecasting models. In this paper, these forecast errors are han-
dled by up and down reserves, which are scheduled as functions
of the standard deviations of the forecasted wind power and the
total forecasted demand of the system as follows [24]:
RUt = R
D
t = κ
√(
σDt
)2
+
∑
j
(
σWjt
)2 (1)
where κ is a parameter decided by the system operator and is
selected to be 3 in this paper.
The reserve clearing process is assumed to be independent
from the day-ahead energy clearing and is modeled as
minRUit,RDit
∑
i
λRUit R
U
it + λ
RD
it R
D
it (2a)
Subject to
0 ≤ RUit ≤ RUmaxi ∀i, t (2b)
0 ≤ RDit ≤ RDmaxi ∀i, t (2c)∑
i
RUit = R
U
t ∀t (2d)∑
i
RDit = R
D
t ∀t. (2e)
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
The objective function (2a) is to minimize the total cost of
reserve. Constraints (2b) and (2c) are the reserve bounds for
each conventional generating unit. The reserve requirement is
met in constraints (2d) and (2e).
The uncertain bidding prices of other strategic conventional
power producers who also have the market power to change
the market clearing price are forecasted and included as inde-
pendent random variables in the day-ahead market clearing
model. In this paper, these random variables are represented via
scenarios. The number of the scenarios will increase rapidly
with the number of the strategic power producers whose uncer-
tain bidding prices are considered. In fact, if the uncertainty
(i.e., change) of the bidding price of another strategic producer
has no or negligible impact on the LMPs at the buses having
generating units of the wind power producer, it is not neces-
sary for the wind power producer to consider the uncertainty
of the bidding price of that strategic producer. In this paper,
the sensitivities of the LMPs at the buses having the wind
power producer’s generating units to the bidding prices of other
strategic conventional power producers are analyzed using the
perturbation approach proposed in [25]. The details of this
method are provided in the Appendix. Using this method, the
strategic conventional power producers that have nonnegligible
LMP sensitivities to the wind power producer will be identified
and the uncertainties of their bidding prices will be considered
in the proposed model. Suppose that IS (IS ≤ I) strategic con-
ventional power producers are selected and each of them has
ΩiS (iS = 1, . . . , IS) bidding prices. Then, the total number of
scenarios in the day-ahead market will be ΩD = ΠISiS=1ΩiS .
In the real-time market clearing process, the main uncer-
tainties come from the intentional misscheduling of load and
wind power production deviation. If the power purchasers pre-
dict that the real-time price will be lower than the day-ahead
price, they may intentionally underschedule load in the day-
ahead market and buy extra demand in the real-time market at
the real-time price. Otherwise, if the power purchasers expect
that the real-time price will be higher than day-ahead price, they
may intentionally over-schedule load and sell any extra energy
procured in the day-ahead market back to the system at the
real-time price. The behavior of these purchasers will increase
the real-time price volatility. For a wind power producer, the
deviation of the actual production from that scheduled in the
day-ahead market will be balanced in the real-time market.
If the actual production is less than the day-ahead scheduled,
the wind producer will have to buy the deviated power at the
real-time price. Otherwise, the wind producer can bid the extra
power into the real-time market and get paid for the accepted
power at the real-time price.
The uncertainties in the day-ahead and real-time markets
are considered as random variables and can be represented
via scenarios. The method to generate a large number of
scenarios for random variables and then reduce them to a
sufficiently small number of scenarios has been explained in
[26]. That method will be applied in this paper for scenario
generation and reduction of the forecasted bidding prices of
other selected strategic conventional power producers, real-time
demand, and wind power production. The correlation between
real-time demand and wind power production is considered
Fig. 1. Structure of the proposed bilevel stochastic optimization model.
in the scenario generating process and then the fast-forward
scenario reduction technique [26] is applied to reduce the sce-
narios to a sufficiently low number. If ΩL reduced scenarios are
selected for the real-time demand and ΩWj reduced scenarios
are selected for the power production of each wind generating
unit j, the total number of scenarios in the real-time market
will be Ω = ΩDΩL
∏
j Ω
W
j . Then, the real-time market will be
cleared and the resulting real-time LMPs will be obtained for
each scenario. In order to connect the forecasted wind power
production with the wind power bid in the day-ahead market,
ΩWj is set equal to B, which is the maximum number of energy
blocks. The generated scenarios of the forecasted production of
each wind generating unit j in a period t will be sorted in an
increasing manner to form a scenario set WP (j, t) = {PWfjtω ,
ω = 1, 2, . . . ,ΩWj }.
The decision process of the wind power producer can be
arranged in a two-stage scenario tree. In the first stage, the
producer determines the bidding strategy for the day-ahead
market for each period of the market horizon. The second-
stage decisions are made for each realized scenario, where the
real-time demand and wind power production become known.
III. BILEVEL STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION MODEL
FOR A STRATEGIC WIND POWER PRODUCER
A. Bilevel Model Structure
The problem to determine the optimal bidding strategy for
a strategic wind power producer is formulated as a bilevel
stochastic optimization model. Fig. 1 shows the structure of
the bilevel model, which consists of an upper–lower problem
and two lower level problems. The upper level problem max-
imizes the total profit obtained by the wind power producer
in both day-ahead and real-time markets to determine its opti-
mal bidding curves in both markets. The maximal profit and
the resulting bidding curves depend on the cleared information
(LMPs and scheduled energy) in the day-ahead and real-time
markets, which will be obtained in the lower level problems.
One lower level problem collects the bidding information of
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each producer and runs the day-ahead market clearing process
to generate the day-ahead LMPs and energy schedule for each
producer. The other lower level problem is carried out after the
day-ahead clearing to deal with the real-time energy deviation.
This real-time market clearing process depends on not only the
real-time offering curve of each producer but also the day-ahead
energy schedule. Both the real-time LMPs and the real-time
energy schedule will be announced after the clearing.
B. Upper Level Problem
The upper level problem (3) maximizing the total profit of
the wind power producer in the day-ahead and real-time market
is shown as follows:
minΞ
∑
jtω
πω
[∑
b
(
−λDA(m:j∈ΨWm )tωp
WD
bjtω
)
−λRT(m:j∈ΨWm )tωP
WR
jtω
]
− β
(
ζ − 1
1− α
∑
ω
πωηω
)
(3a)
Subject to
0 ≤ λWD(b−1)jtω ≤ λWDbjtω ≤ λCapD ∀j, b ≥ 2, t, ω (3b)
0 ≤ λWRjtω ≤ λCapR ∀j, t, ω (3c)
ηω ≥ 0 ∀ω (3d)
ζ − ηω ≤
∑
jt
[∑
b
(
−λDA(m:j∈ΨWm )tωp
WD
bjtω
)
+λRT(m:j∈ΨWm )tωP
WR
jtω
]
∀ω (3e)
(4) (3f)
(5) (3g)
where m:w ∈ ΨWm denotes the bus where the wind power
generating unit w is located, and Ξ = {λWDbjtω, λWRjtω , ς, ηω,
ΞD, ΞR} are the set of all decision variables of the problem
(3), where ΞD and ΞR are the sets of all the decision variables
in the lower level problems (4) and (5), respectively, and will
be defined later.
The objective function (3a) minimizes the sum of two terms:
1) the negative expected profit of the wind power producer,
which is the negative revenue obtained in the day-ahead mar-
ket plus the negative revenue from the real-time market and
2) the negative CVaRα multiplied by the weighting factor β.
In (3a), λDA(m:j∈ΨWm )tωand p
WD
bjtω are the variables determined
in the lower level problem (4), while λRT(m:j∈ΨWm )tω and P
WR
jtω
are the variables determined in the lower level problem (5).
Constraints (3b) and (3c) enforce the acceptable day-ahead and
real-time bidding prices and nondecreasing day-ahead bidding
curves of the wind power producer. Constraints (3d) and (3e)
are used to compute the CVaR [28], which is used in this paper
as a measurement for risk. The CVaRα represents the expected
profit associated with the (1− α)× 100% worst scenarios. The
weighting parameter β is set by the wind power producer to
model the tradeoff between profit and risk. If the wind power
producer is willing to gain less profit in order to bear less risk,
it will select a higher value for β.
C. Lower Level Problem for Day-Ahead Market Clearing
The lower level problem (4) is formulated to represent the
day-ahead market clearing process as follows:
minΞD
∑
bi
λCDbitωp
CD
bitω +
∑
bj
λWDbjtωp
WD
bwtω −
∑
ld
λLDldt p
LD
ldtω
(4a)
Subject to∑
l(d∈ΨDm)
pLDldtω −
∑
b(i∈ΨIm)
pCDbitω −
∑
b(j∈ΨWm )
pWDbjtω
+
∑
n∈Φm
Bmn
(
δDmtω − δDntω
)
= 0:λDAmtω ∀m, t, ω
(4b)
0 ≤ pCDbitω ≤ pCDmaxbit :μCmaxbitω , μCminbitω ∀b, i, t, ω (4c)
0 ≤ pWDbjtω ≤ PWfjtb :μWmaxbjtω , μWminbjtω , b = 1 ∀j, t, ω (4d)
0 ≤ pWDbjtω ≤ PWfjtb − PWfjt(b−1):μWmaxbjtω , μWminbjtω ∀b ≥ 2, j, t, ω
(4e)
0 ≤ pLDldtω ≤ pLDmaxldt :μLmaxldtω , μLminldtω ∀l, d, t, ω (4f)
|Bmn
(
δDmtω − δDntω
) |
≤ Cmaxmn :βDmaxmntω , βDminmntω ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t, ω (4g)
δminm ≤ δDmtω ≤ δmaxm :θDmaxmtω , θDminmtω ∀m, t, ω (4h)
δDmtω = 0:θ
D1
tω ,m = 1 ∀t, ω (4i)
where PWfjtb is the bth element in the set WP (j, t), and ΞD =
{pCDbitω, pWDbjtω, pLDldtω, δDmtω, λDAmtω, μCmaxbitω , μCminbitω , μWmaxbjtω ,
μWminbjtω , μ
Lmax
ldtω , μ
Lmin
ldtω , β
Dmax
mntω , β
Dmin
mntω , θ
Dmax
mtω , θ
Dmin
mtω , θ
D1
tω }
is the set of all decision variables of the problem (4). The
decision variable set contains both primal and dual variables,
where the dual variables are defined following the colon in
each constraint.
The objective function (4a) minimizes the total cost of energy
offered by both conventional and wind power producers minus
the revenue from supplying demand in each period and each
scenario. Equation (4b) enforces the day-ahead power balance
at each bus. Constraints (4c)–(4e) represent the limits of the
power offered by the conventional and wind power units in each
block. Constraint (4f) represents the bounds of the demand in
each block. Constraint (4g) imposes the transmission capacity
limits of each power line. The voltage angle limits of each bus
are expressed in constraint (4h). The reference bus is selected
in (4i). Note that if the uncertainty of the bidding prices of the
conventional power producer i is not considered, then λCDbitω =
λCDbitω ∀ω, ω′.
D. Lower Level Problem for Real-Time Market Clearing
The lower level problem (5) modeling the real-time market
clearing process is formulated as follows:
minΞR
∑
i
(
λCR+it P
CR+
itω − λCR−it PCR−itω
)
+
∑
j
λWRjtω P
WR
jtω
+
∑
i
(
λRUit r
U
itω + λ
RU
it r
U
itω
)−∑
d
λLRdtωP
LR
dtω (5a)
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Subject to
∑
d∈ΨDm
(
PLRdtω +
∑
l
pLDldtω
)
−
∑
b(i∈ΨIm)
pCDbitω
−
∑
i∈ΨIm
(
PCR+itω − PCR−itω + rUitω − rDitω
)
−
∑
b(j∈ΨWm )
pWDbjtω −
∑
j∈ΨWm
PWRjtω
+
∑
n∈Φm
Bmn
(
δRmtω − δRntω
)
= 0:λRTmtω ∀m, t, ω
(5b)
0 ≤ PCR+itω ≤ Pmax+i :μmax+itω , μmin+itω ∀i, t, ω (5c)
0 ≤ PCR−itω ≤ Pmax−i :μmax−itω , μmin−itω ∀i, t, ω (5d)
PCR+itω ≤ Pmaxi −
∑
b
pCDbit :μ
CR+
itω ∀i, t, ω (5e)
PCR−itω ≤
∑
b
pCDbit :μ
CR−
itω ∀i, t, ω (5f)
−
∑
b
pWDbjt ≤ PWRjtω ≤ PWfjtω
−
∑
b
pWDbjt :μ
WRmax
jtω , μ
WRmin
jtω ∀j, t, ω (5g){
0≤PLRdtω ≤ PLRfdtω , :μLRmaxdtω , μLRmindtω ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω ≥0
PLRfdtω ≤PLRdtω ≤0, :μLRmaxdtω , μLRmindtω ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω < 0
(5h)
0 ≤ rUitω ≤ RUit :ϕUmaxitω , ϕUminitω ∀i, t, ω (5i)
0 ≤ rDitω ≤ RDit :ϕDmaxitω , ϕDminitω ∀i, t, ω (5j)
|Bmn
(
δRmtω − δRntω
) |
≤ Cmaxmn :βRmaxmntω , βRminmntω ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t, ω (5k)
δminm ≤ δRmtω ≤ δmaxmt :θRmaxmtω , θRminmtω ∀m, t, ω (5l)
δRmtω = 0:θ
R1
tω ,m = 1 ∀t, ω (5m)
where ΞR is the set of all primal and dual decision vari-
ables in the problem (5), i.e., ΞR = {PCR+itω , PCR−itω , PWRjtω ,
PLRdtω , r
U
itω, r
D
itω, δ
R
mtω, λ
RT
mtω, μ
max+
itω , μ
min+
itω , μ
max−
itω , μ
min−
itω ,
μCR+itω , μ
CR−
itω , μ
WRmax
jtω , μ
WRmin
jtω , μ
LRmax
dtω , μ
LRmin
dtω , ϕ
Umax
itω ,
ϕUminitω , ϕ
Dmax
itω , ϕ
Dmin
itω , β
Rmax
mntω , β
Rmin
mntω, θ
Rmax
mtω , θ
Rmin
mtω , θ
R1
tω }.
The objective function (5a) minimizes the total cost of
redispatching energy and deploying reserve minus the revenue
from the deviation demand in each period and each scenario.
Equation (5b) enforces the real-time power balance at each bus.
Constraints (5c)–(5f) limit the power of each conventional gen-
erator that can be sold into the real-time market. The amount
of wind power that can be sold in the real-time market in
each scenario is constrained by the forecasted wind power in
the scenario, as described by (5g). The bounds of the deviated
demand in each scenario are represented by constraint (5h). The
deployed up and down reserves are bounded by the scheduled
up and down reserves in the day-ahead market, respectively, as
expressed in (5i) and (5j), respectively. Constraint (5k) imposes
the transmission capacity limits of each power line. The volt-
age angle limits of each bus are expressed in constraint (5l).
The reference bus is selected in (5m).
The wind power trading in the real-time market is different
from the conventional power producers due to the uncertainty
in the wind power production. The wind power producer may
fail to fulfill the productions settled in the day-ahead market
and is forced to correct its negative deviation in the real-time
market. Meanwhile, the wind power producer can bid the extra
power into the real-time market if the deviation is positive. The
rescheduled wind power is constrained by (5g) for both cases.
Since the day-ahead market is cleared prior to the real-time mar-
ket, the decision variables RUit and RDit of the problem (2) and
pCDbitω , p
WD
bjtω , and pLDldtω of the problem (4) are considered to be
parameters in the problem (5).
IV. MODEL CONVERSION
To facilitate the solution process, the bilevel programming
problem (3)–(5) is transferred into an equivalent single-level
MPEC problem through the KKT conditions [13] of the lower
level problems (4) and (5).
A. Optimality Condition of (4)
The problem (4) is transferred by its KKT condition as
follows:
λCDbitω − λDAmtω + μCmaxbitω − μCminbitω = 0 ∀b, i ∈ ΨIm, t, ω (6a)
λWDbwtω − λDAmtω + μWmaxbjtω − μWminbjtω = 0 ∀b, j ∈ ΨWm , t, ω
(6b)
− λLDldt + λDAmtω + μLmaxldtω − μLminldtω = 0 ∀l, d ∈ ΨDm, t, ω
(6c)∑
n∈Φm
Bmn
(
λDAmtω − λDAntω + βDmaxmntω − βDmaxnmtω + βDminmntω
−βDminnmtω
)
+ θDmaxmtω − θDminmtω + θD1tω |m=1 = 0 ∀m, t, ω
(6d)
(4b) (6e)
0 ≤ pCDbitω ⊥μCminbitω ≥ 0 ∀b, i, t, ω (6f)
0 ≤ (pCDmaxbit − pCDbitω) ⊥μCmaxbitω ≥ 0 ∀b, i, t, ω (6g)
0 ≤ pWDbjt ⊥μWminbjtω ≥ 0 ∀b, w, t, ω (6h)
0 ≤
(
PWfjtb − pWDbjtω
)
⊥μWmaxbjtω ≥ 0, b = 1 ∀j, t, ω (6i)
0 ≤
(
PWfjtb − PWfjt(b−1) − pWDbjtω
)
⊥μWmaxbjtω ≥0 ∀b≥2, j, t, ω
(6j)
0 ≤ pLDldtω ⊥μLminldtω ≥ 0 ∀l, d, t, ω (6k)
0 ≤ (pLDmaxldt − pLDldtω)⊥μLmaxldtω ≥ 0 ∀l, d, t, ω (6l)
0 ≤ [Cmaxmn +Bmn (δDmtω − δDntω)]⊥βDminmntω
≥ 0 ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t, ω (6m)
0 ≤ [Cmaxmn −Bmn (δDmtω − δDntω)]⊥βDmaxmntω
≥ 0 ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t, ω (6n)
0 ≤ (δminm + δDmtω)⊥ θDminmtω ≥ 0 ∀m, t, ω (6o)
0 ≤ (δmaxm − δDmtω)⊥ θDmaxmtω ≥ 0 ∀m, t, ω (6p)
where ⊥ denotes complementarity operation.
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B. Optimality Condition of (5)
Similarly, the problem (5) is transferred by its KKT condition
as follows:
λCR+it − λRTmtω + μmax+itω − μmin+itω + μCR+itω =0 ∀i ∈ ΨIm, t, ω
(7a)
−λCR−it + λRTmtω + μmax−itω − μmin−itω + μCR−itω
= 0 ∀i ∈ ΨIm, t, ω (7b)
λWRjtω − λRTmtω + μWRmaxjtω − μWRminjtω = 0 ∀j ∈ ΨWm , t, ω
(7c)
λRUit − λRTmtω + ϕUmaxitω − ϕUminitω = 0 ∀i ∈ ΨIm, t, ω (7d)
λRDit + λ
RT
mtω + ϕ
Dmax
itω − ϕDminitω = 0 ∀i ∈ ΨIm, t, ω (7e)
− λLRdtω + λRTmtω + μLRmaxitω − μLRminitω = 0 ∀l, d ∈ ΨDm, t
(7f)∑
n∈Φm
Bmn
(
λRTmtω − λRTntω + βRmaxmntω − βRmaxnmtω + βRminmntω
−βRminnmtω
)
+ θRmaxmtω − θRminmtω + θR1t |m=1 = 0 ∀m, t, ω
(7g)
(5b) (7h)
0 ≤ PCR+itω ⊥μmin+itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7i)
0 ≤ (Pmax+i − PCR+itω )⊥μmax+itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7j)
0 ≤ PCR−itω ⊥μmin−itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7k)
0 ≤ (Pmax−i − PCR−itω )⊥μmax−itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7l)
0 ≤
(
Pmax−i −
∑
b
pCDbit − PCR+itω
)
⊥μCR+itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω
(7m)
0 ≤
(∑
b
pCDbit − PCR−itω
)
⊥μCR−itω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7n)
0 ≤
(∑
b
pWDbjt + P
WR
jtω
)
⊥μWRminjtω ≥ 0 ∀j, t, ω (7o)
0 ≤
(
PWfjtb −
∑
b
pWDbjt − PWRjtω
)
⊥μWRmaxjtω ≥ 0 ∀j, t, ω
(7p)⎧⎨
⎩
0 ≤ PLRdtω ⊥μLRmindtω ≥ 0 ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω ≥ 0
0 ≤
(
PLRfdtω − PLRdtω
)
⊥μLRmindtω ≥ 0 ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω < 0
(7q)⎧⎨
⎩ 0 ≤
(
PLRfdtω − PLRdtω
)
⊥μLRmaxdtω ≥ 0 ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω ≥ 0
0 ≤ PLRdtω ⊥μLRmaxdtω ≥ 0 ∀d, t, ω, ifPLRfdtω < 0
(7r)
0 ≤ rUitω ⊥ϕUminitω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7s)
0 ≤ (RUit − rUitω)⊥ϕUmaxitω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7t)
0 ≤ rDitω ⊥ϕDminitω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7u)
0 ≤ (RDit − rDitω)⊥ϕDmaxitω ≥ 0 ∀i, t, ω (7v)
0 ≤ [Cmaxmn +Bmn (δRmtω − δRntω)]⊥βRminmnt
≥ 0 ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t (7w)
0 ≤ [Cmaxmn −Bmn (δRmtω − δRntω)]⊥βRmaxmnt
≥ 0 ∀m,n ∈ Φm, t (7x)
0 ≤ (δminm + δRmtω)⊥ θRminmtω ≥ 0 ∀m, t, ω (7y)
0 ≤ (δmaxm − δRmtω)⊥ θRmaxmtω ≥ 0 ∀m, t, ω (7z)
C. Reformulate MPEC as an MILP
The MPEC problem having the objective function (3a) and
subject to constraints (3b)–(3e), (6), and (7) is a nonlinear
programming problem, where the nonlinearities come from
the following three main sources. By linearizing the nonlinear
terms, the MPEC problem is converted into an MILP problem,
which can be solved effectively.
1) The ∑jb λDA(m:j∈ΨWm )tωpWDbjtω term in (3a).
According to (6b), (6h), (6i), (6j), and the strong duality
theorem, this term can be linearized to (8) [29].∑
jb
λDA(m:j∈ΨWm )tωp
WD
bjtω
=
∑
jb
(
λWDbjtω + μ
Wmax
bjtω − μWminbjtω
)
pWDbjtω
=−
∑
bi
λCDbitωp
CD
bitω −
∑
bi
pCDmaxbit μ
Cmax
bitω
+
∑
ld
λLDldt p
LD
ldtω −
∑
ld
pLDmaxldt μ
Lmax
ldtω
−
∑
m(n∈Φm)
Cmaxmn
(
βDmaxmntω + β
Dmin
mntω
)
−
∑
m
(
δmaxm θ
Dmax
mtω − δminm θDminmtω
)
(8)
2) The ∑j λRT(m:j∈ΨWm )tωpWRjtω term in (3a).
Similar to (8), according to (7c), (7o), (7p), and the strong
duality theorem, this term can be linearized to (9) [29].∑
j
λRT(m:j∈ΨWm )tωp
WR
jtω
=
∑
j
(
λWDjtω + μ
WRmax
jtω − μWRminjtω
)
pWRjtω
=−
∑
i
(
λCR+it P
CR+
itω − λCR−it PCR−itω
)
−
∑
i
(
λRUit r
U
itω + λ
RD
it r
D
itω
)
+
∑
d
λLRdtωP
LR
dtω
−
∑
i
(
Pmax+i μ
max+
itω + P
max−
i μ
max−
itω
)
−
∑
i
μCR+itω
(
Pmaxi −
∑
b
pCDbit
)
−
∑
i
μCR−itω
∑
b
pCDbit
−
∑
i
(
ϕUmaxitω R
U
it + ϕ
Dmax
itω R
D
it
)
−
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
d P
LRf
dtω μ
LRmax
dtω , ifP
LRf
dtω ≥ 0∑
d P
LRf
dtω μ
LRmin
dtω , ifP
LRf
dtω < 0
−
∑
m(n∈Φm)
Cmaxmn
(
βRmaxmntω + β
Rmin
mntω
)
−
∑
m
(
δmaxm θ
Rmax
mtω − δminm θRminmtω
)
.
(9)
There is still a nonlinear term
(
μCR+itω − μCR−itω
)∑
b p
CD
bit in
(9). It can be linearized using the method in [30].
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3) The MPEC model includes the nonlinear complemen-
tarity constraints (6f)–(6p) and (7i)–(7z). According to
[27], the complementarity constraint in the form of 0 ≤
P ⊥Q ≥ 0 can be replaced by the following formulation:
P ≥ 0, Q ≥ 0, P ≤ μM,Q ≤ (1− μ)M,μ ∈ {0, 1}
(10)
where M is a sufficiently large constant. Its value can be differ-
ent for different complementarity constraints. Usually, M is set
to be (dual variable + 1)× 100.
V. CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
The proposed model is tested using the IEEE Reliability Test
System [31], which has ten conventional power producers and
one wind power producer. The data of the conventional gener-
ators are obtained from [32]. The total installed wind capacity
PWmax of the only wind power producer is 1000 MW, which
is approximately 23% of the total installed generation capac-
ity in the system. In all case studies except for those explained
specifically, all wind power generating units are located at bus
8 and the wind power producer is a strategic player in both
the day-ahead and the real-time markets. The wind power data
are obtained from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
website [33]. The historical data of the real-time demand are
obtained from the PJM market [34]. The sensitivity analysis of
the day-ahead LMPs with respect to the bidding prices of each
conventional power producer will be conducted in Section V-D.
The uncertainties of the bidding prices of the selected conven-
tional power producers will then be considered as additional
scenarios in the model for case studies in Section V-D, but are
not included in other case studies in this section for simplicity.
The parameters α and β in (3a) are set to be 0.95 and 0, respec-
tively. λCapD and λCapR are set to be $1000/MWh. In all of
the case studies, the MILP problem is solved using Gurobi 5.5
in MATLAB [35].
The autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model [4] is used to generate 5000 scenarios of wind power
and real-time demand, respectively. Then, the scenario reduc-
tion method [26] is applied to reduce the number of scenarios
for the wind power and real-time demand. In order to deter-
mine the best number of scenarios for the case studies, the
objective value of (3a) and the CVaR (when β = 0.1) of the
wind power producer are calculated using the MILP model for
different number of scenarios. As shown in Fig. 2, both the
objective value and CVaR initially decrease significantly when
the number of scenarios increases, but only change slightly after
the number of scenarios is larger than 32. For example, the
percentage changes of both the objective value and the CVaR
by increasing the scenario number from 64 to 128 are less
than 0.7%. Therefore, 64 scenarios are selected for the case
studies in this paper as a tradeoff between the accuracy and
computational cost.
Table I lists the information (values and probabilities) of
the resulting eight wind power scenarios and eight real-time
demand scenarios for a certain hour, where a real-time demand
scenario is described by the ratio of the forecasted real-time
demand to the day-ahead demand.
Fig. 2. Objective value and CVaR (when β = 0.1) of the wind power producer
versus the number of scenarios.
TABLE I
SCENARIO INFORMATION
TABLE II
PROFITS OF THE WIND POWER PRODUCER IN FOUR CASES
A. Comparison of Strategic and Nonstrategic Wind Power
Producers
Four cases are compared in this study: (a) the wind power
producer is a strategic player in both the day-ahead and real-
time markets; (b) the wind power producer is a strategic player
in the day-ahead market only; (c) the wind power producer is a
strategic player in the real-time market only; and (d) the wind
power producer is a nonstrategic player in both the day-ahead
and the real-time markets. The bidding prices will be set to
be zero for a nonstrategic wind power producer in the market.
Table II shows the profits of the wind power producer in the four
cases and the percentage decreases in the expected profit of the
last three cases with respect to the first case. The wind power
producer achieves the highest profit by being a strategic player
in both the day-ahead and the real-time markets. Moreover,
the wind power producer obtains more profit in Case (b) than
in Case (c), which suggests that the day-ahead market has
more influence on the wind power producer than the real-time
market.
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Fig. 3. Day-ahead and average real-time LMPs at bus 8 and average selling
price of the wind power producer for different wind power penetration levels.
B. Impact of Wind Power Penetration Level
In this study, the installed wind power capacity is changed
from 200 (5% penetration) to 1600 MW (33% penetration) with
an increment of 200 MW. No capacity limits are imposed on the
transmission constraints. The day-ahead and average real-time
LMPs of the 64 scenarios at bus 8 and the average selling price
of the wind power producer are shown in Fig. 3 for different
wind power penetration levels.
Due to the fact that wind power has no fuel cost, selling
wind power into the market will lower the LMP. As shown
in Fig. 3, both the day-ahead LMP and the average real-time
LMP decrease as the penetration level of wind power increases.
However, due to the effect of the uncertainties in the real-time
market, the real-time LMP is more sensitive than the day-ahead
LMP to the changes of the demand and wind power supply.
Therefore, the rate of decrease in the average real-time LMP is
much greater than that of the average day-ahead LMP. When the
penetration level is relatively low (5%–15%), the average sell-
ing price of wind power increases with the increase in the wind
power penetration level. At these penetration levels, since the
real-time LMP is much higher than the day-ahead LMP, sell-
ing more wind power into the real-time market will increase
the average selling price. However, when the penetration level
is relatively high (15%–32%), the average selling price of wind
power decreases with the increase in the wind penetration level.
At these penetration levels, since the real-time LMP decreases
faster than the day-ahead LMP and is even lower than the day-
ahead LMP when the penetration level becomes higher than
25%, selling the extra wind power into the real-time market will
decrease the average selling price.
As can been seen more clearly from Fig. 4, the profit of
the wind power producer in the day-ahead market stays almost
the same at first, then increases dramatically, and finally sta-
bilizes at a certain value when the penetration level increases.
The cause of this result is explained as follows. When the pen-
etration level of wind power is below 18%, the wind power
producer does not have enough market power to influence the
day-ahead LMPs. Therefore, the day-ahead LMP stays constant
when the wind power penetration level changes within 18%.
Moreover, when the wind power penetration level changes,
the load demand in the day-ahead market does not change.
Therefore, the amounts of power bid into the day-ahead market
Fig. 4. Day-ahead, real-time, and total profits of the wind power producer for
different penetration levels of wind power.
by the wind producer and the conventional generating units
almost do not change. As a result, the profit of the wind pro-
ducer in the day-ahead market almost does not change. The
results also show that the wind power producer intends to
sell more power into the real-time market to gain more profit
because the real-time LMP is higher than the day-ahead LMP.
This, however, results in a decline of the real-time price. As the
wind power penetration level goes higher, the day-ahead LMP
decreases dramatically; but, the profit of the wind producer
obtained from the day-ahead market still increases because
more power is sold into the day-ahead market. However, the
system’s ability to consume wind power in the day-ahead mar-
ket is limited. As the wind power penetration level reaches 25%,
further increasing the penetration level only results in a slight
change in the day-ahead LMP and a slight increase in the wind
power sold into the day-ahead market. Therefore, the day-ahead
profit curve is almost constant as the wind power penetration
level goes beyond 25%.
The profit in the real-time market increases first until the pen-
etration level reaches 18%. Beyond this penetration level, the
real-time profit decreases when the day-ahead profit increases
and then increases, but is always below the day-ahead profit
when the penetration level exceeds 21%. As the real-time price
decreases to a certain level, the wind power producer will not
sell all of its extra power into the real-time market to prevent
further decrease in the real-time price and possible decrease in
the total profit. As a result, some of the wind power genera-
tion capacity will be wasted as the wind power penetration level
goes high. Therefore, it is important for the wind power produc-
ers to choose their installation capacities in a certain system. For
example, in [36], the authors proposed a bilevel model to deter-
mine the optimal investment for a strategic wind power investor
and concluded that the strategic behavior would increase the
profit of the wind power investor when compared to the price-
taker behavior. As Fig. 4 shows, the total profit of the wind
producer increases with the wind penetration level.
C. Impact of Transmission Constraint
In this study, the wind power capacity is 1000 MW. The
proposed model is solved to obtain the optimal bidding strat-
egy for the wind producer for four cases: (a) no capacity limits
are imposed on any transmission lines; and a capacity limit of
(b) 190 MW, (c) 100 MW, and (d) 30 MW is imposed on the
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
Fig. 5. Real-time LMPs at bus 8 in Cases (a), (b), and (c) in different scenarios.
TABLE III
PROFITS OF THE WIND PRODUCER AND DAY-AHEAD LMP
AT BUS 8 IN DIFFERENT CASES
transmission line 8–9. Fig. 5 compares the real-time LMPs at
bus 8 in different scenarios for Cases (a), (b), and (c). Case (d)
is not plotted because the real-time LMPs of Cases (c) and (d)
are the same. The profits of the wind power producer in the
day-ahead and real-time markets, the total profit of the wind
producer, and the day-ahead LMP at bus 8 for different cases
are given in Table III.
When no capacity limits are imposed on the transmission
lines, the power flow through line 8–9 is 75 MW in the
day-ahead market and maximally 292 MW in the real-time
market. As shown in Fig. 4, when the transmission capacity of
line 8–9 is limited to 190 MW [Case (b)], the real-time LMP
in Scenario 64 is higher than that in Case (a). Although the
amount of wind power sold into the day-ahead market in Case
(b) is lower than that in Case (a), the total profit in Case (b)
is higher than that in Case (a) owing to the higher real-time
LMPs. Limiting the transmission capacity to 100 MW in Case
(c) will further increase the real-time LMP when compared to
Case (b), as shown in Fig. 5. As a consequence, less amount of
wind power will be sold in the day-ahead market in Case (c)
when compared with Cases (a) and (b). However, the increase
in the real-time LMP will not be able to compensate for the
profit loss due to the decrease in the wind power sold in the day-
ahead market caused by the transmission congestion. In Case
(d), the profit in the day-ahead market increases slightly com-
pared to Case (c) owing to the increase in the day-ahead LMP.
However, the total profit decreases dramatically compared with
the previous three cases due to the small transmission capacity
limit.
Based on the four case studies, it can conclude that trans-
mission congestion can be sometimes beneficial to wind power
producers and can be used as a strategic mechanism to increase
their profits.
Fig. 6. Objective value of the wind power producer versus the number of
scenarios in the day-ahead market.
D. Impact of the Uncertainties of Other Producers’ Bidding
Strategies
In this case, the wind power producer’s capacity is 500 MW,
and no capacity limits are imposed on the transmission lines.
The LMP sensitivity analysis is carried out to select the strate-
gic producers whose bidding prices will have nonnegligible
impacts on the LMP at the bus (i.e., bus 8) where the wind
power units are located and the LMP sensitivities to all other
producers’ bidding prices are defined as follows:
∂λDAmt
∂λCDbit
(11)
for all i ∈ I, b ∈ B,m = 8.
The LMP sensitivity analysis result shows that the LMP
λDA8t in the period t is most sensitive to the bidding price of the
first block of the conventional power producer 1 since λCD1,1t is
fairly close to the cleared LMP, while the LMP sensitivities to
all of the other conventional power producers expressed by (11)
are close to zero. Thus, only the uncertainty of the conventional
power producer 1’s bidding strategy is considered via scenarios
in the model.
The similar scenario generation and reduction process used
for the real-time demand and wind power production is applied
to the bidding price of the first block of the conventional power
producer 1. Fig. 6 shows that the objective value of the wind
power producer decreases as the number of scenarios of the
conventional power producer 1’s bidding price in the day-ahead
market increases. When the number of scenarios increases from
6 to 8, the objective value only changes by 0.2%. Therefore, six
additional scenarios are incorporated in the day-ahead market
clearing model to characterize the uncertainty of the bidding
price of the first block of the conventional power producer 1.
The total number of scenarios of the real-time market clearing
model increases to 384 then.
The six scenarios are sorted in a sequence that the bidding
price of the first block of the conventional power producer 1
increases. The day-ahead LMP at bus 8, the expected profits
of the wind power producer in the day-ahead and real-time
markets, and the expected total profit are calculated using the
proposed model with the added six scenarios and shown in
Fig. 7. The day-head LMP at bus 8 increases as the bidding
price of the conventional power producer 1 increases. The wind
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Fig. 7. Expected profits of the wind power producer in the day-ahead and real-
time markets, the expected total profit, and the day-ahead LMP at bus 8 in
different scenarios of the day-ahead market.
TABLE IV
PROFITS OF EACH WIND FARM AND DAY-AHEAD LMP
IN DIFFERENT CASES
power producer bids more power and gains more profit in the
day-ahead market and less profit in the real-time market as the
day-ahead LMP increases. Even though the bidding prices of
the conventional power producer 1 in difference scenarios vary
considerably (the difference between Scenario 6 and Scenario
1 is 10%), the total profits of the wind power producer in differ-
ent scenarios are relatively stable and the maximum variation is
only 2.8%. These results show that the wind power producer is
capable of handling the uncertainties of other power producers’
bidding strategies in a certain range.
E. Wind Power Generating Units at Different Locations
In this case, it is assumed that the wind power producer has
two wind farms with the same installed capacity of 500 MW
located at different buses, i.e., buses 7 (wind farm 1) and 8
(wind farm 2). The proposed model is solved for three cases:
(a) no capacity limits are imposed on any transmission lines;
and a capacity limit of (b) 100 MW and (c) 30 MW is imposed
on the transmission line 7–8. The profits gained from the day-
ahead and real-time markets and the total profit of each wind
farm are shown in Table IV.
The negative profit of wind farm 1 in the real-time mar-
ket indicates that it has to purchase the deficit power from
the real-time market. Wind farm 1 gains profit from the day-
ahead market and has loss in the real-time market, while wind
farm 2 gains profits from both the day-ahead and real-time mar-
kets. This result indicates that wind power generating units in
different locations owned by the same producer may behave
differently in the market even their LMPs are the same. Since
bus 7 is only connected to the system through line 7–8, if
wind farm 1 has deficit power in the real-time market, it can
Fig. 8. Expected total profit and CVaR of the wind power producer for different
values of β.
Fig. 9. Wind power sold into the day-ahead market for different values of β.
only purchase power from wind farm 2 to cover the deficiency.
As transmission limits are imposed to line 7–8, compared to
Case (a), the total profit of wind farm 1 decreases to 19.0% in
Case (b) and 88.55% in Case (c), while the total profit of wind
farm 2 decreases to 12.85% in Case (b) and 64.42% in Case
(c). The results show that the transmission congestion has a
greater effect on wind farm 1 than wind farm 2. This case study
shows that the proposed model is also effective for obtaining
the optimal bidding strategies for wind power producers with
multiple wind farms in different locations.
F. Impact of Risk Management
In this study, the installed wind power is 1000 MW. The
proposed model is solved for different values of β in (3a). As
shown in Fig. 8, the expected total profit of the wind power
producer decreases and the CVaR increases with the increase
of β. The wind bidding capacity in the day-ahead market
decreases when β increases, as plotted in Fig. 9. These results
are expected. A higher β indicates that the wind power pro-
ducer is willing to take less risk by selling less power into the
day-ahead market. As a consequence, the chance of the wind
power producer to counter a negative deviation in the real-time
market decreases. The bidding curves of the wind power pro-
ducer in the day-ahead market for three selected values of β
in Fig. 10 also show this trend: the bidding capacity decreases,
while the bidding price increases as β increases. Moreover, the
expected total profit and bidding strategy are quite sensitive to
the value of β when it is between 0 and 1.0, and its value should
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Fig. 10. Day-ahead bidding curves of the wind power producer for different
values of β.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL TIME AND COMPLEXITY
FOR DIFFERENT CASES
be selected carefully by the wind power producer. These results
show the significance of risk management for the wind power
producer to obtain the optimal bidding strategy.
G. Computational Issue
The computer used for simulation studies has a 3.16-GHz,
4-core CPU and a 16-GB RAM. The computational times and
the numbers of constraints and variables of using the proposed
model with and without transmission constraints for the case
studies are compared in Table V. The proposed model can
be used for systems of larger sizes in real-world applications
where much more powerful computer workstations or clusters
are commonly used.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the wind power penetration level goes higher in the elec-
tricity market, the wind power producer with a large installed
capacity can no longer be considered as a price-taker when
generating its optimal bidding strategy. This paper has pro-
posed a model considering the strategic bidding behavior of a
wind power producer in the electricity market. In the model,
the day-ahead and real-time LMPs are not input data, but vari-
ables that are influenced by the wind power producer. The
optimal bidding strategy of the wind power producer has been
generated by a bilevel stochastic optimization model, which
has been converted into a single-level MILP problem using
the duality theory and KKT condition to facilitate solving
the model. Case studies have been performed for the IEEE
Reliability Test System with a strategic wind producer. Results
have shown that as the wind penetration level goes higher, the
day-ahead and real-time LMPs decrease. The network conges-
tion has inevitable impact on the bidding strategy and can be
used as a strategic mechanism to further increase the profit of
the wind power producer. The LMP sensitivity analysis has
been conducted to help the wind power producer determine
what other strategic conventional power producers’ bidding
prices should be considered as uncertainties in the proposed
model via scenarios. The proposed model is also effective for
wind power producers with generating units in different loca-
tions. Due to the uncertainty of wind power production and
real-time demand, the optimal bidding strategy of the wind
power producer is sensitive to the risk parameters, which should
be chosen carefully by the decision-makers. Further research
will be conducted to study the optimal bidding strategies for
multiple strategic players in an electricity market.
APPENDIX
PERTURBATION APPROACH FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The day-ahead market clearing process (4) can be rewritten
in the following compact form (12):
minx z = f (x,a) (12a)
Subject to
h (x,a) = 0:λ (12b)
g (x,a) ≤ 0 : μ (12c)
where z represents the objective function, the vector x includes
all the primal decision variables, the vector a represents the
bidding prices of the strategic conventional power producers,
and λ and μ are the dual variables for equality and inequality
constraints, respectively. In this paper, λ is the set of the LMP
at each bus.
According to [25], by differentiating the KKT condition of
problem (12), the following system of linear equations (13) is
satisfied:
[∇xf (x∗,a)]T dx+ [∇af (x∗,a)]T da− dz = 0 (13a)[
∇xxf (x∗,a) +
∑R
r
λ∗r∇xxhr (x∗,a)
+
∑S
s
μ∗s∇xxgs (x∗,a)
]
dx
+
[
∇xaf (x∗,a) +
∑R
r
λ∗r∇xahr (x∗,a)
+
∑S
s
μ∗s∇xags (x∗,a)
]
da+∇xh (x∗,a) dλ
+∇xh (x∗,a) dλ = 0 (13b)
[∇xh (x∗,a)]T dx+ [∇ah (x∗,a)]T da = 0 (13c)
[∇xg (x∗,a)]T dx+ [∇ag (x∗,a)]T da = 0 (13d)
where R and S are the total number of equality and inequal-
ity constraints. Then, dλda , which is the sensitivity of the LMP
at each bus to the bidding prices of the strategic conventional
power producers, can be obtained by solving (13).
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